This paper provides new estimates of the effects of increased federal and state minimum wages on the employment-based health insurance coverage of low-wage workers.
Introduction
Health insurance has become an increasingly important topic for researchers, especially since millions of Americans do not have health insurance coverage. Despite the attention given to the lack of employer-provided health insurance and the falling standard of living for those in the lower part of the income distribution, the gap in coverage between those in the upper part of the income distribution and those in the lower part has actually diminished in the recent years.
However, the gap in coverage remains large. In 2005, for example, nearly 77 percent of those in the upper wage deciles were covered compared with only 23 percent of those in the lowest wage decile. The narrowing of the coverage gap is due to a combination of both reduced coverage in the upper wage deciles and increased coverage in the lowest wage decile.
The widening income gap between those at the top and those at the bottom that has occurred over the past 25 years was one of the motivations for the recently passed increase in the federal minimum wage. The most frequently cited negative impact of increased minimum wages typically is their presumably negative impact on employment, particularly on those who are newest to the labor force and with the lowest levels of skills. Studies of these impacts are decidedly mixed (Card and Krueger 1994; Neumark and Wascher 1998) .
One possible explanation for the failure to find consistently significant effects of minimum wages on employment is that employers are able to adjust on other margins. For example, argued that employers would reduce fringe benefits and provide less pleasant working conditions. Beeson Royalty (2000) and Simon and Kaestner (2003) find no significant effects of the minimum wages on fringe benefits for low-skilled workers, both at the state and federal level. 1 There are two main streams of literature regarding minimum wage laws: one that studies the implications of increases in minimum wages on employment, and another one that explores the relationship between minimum This paper provides new estimates of the effects of increased federal and state minimum wages on the employment-based health insurance coverage of low-wage workers. Using CPS data from 1988 to 2005 and a difference-in-difference approach, I examine the effects of several increases in the state and federal minimum wage on the coverage rates for policyholders of employer provided health insurance for individuals in the lowest 1 and 2 deciles of the hourly wage distribution. Little evidence was found for the federal minimum wage increase of 1990-91, but estimates of the effect of the 1996-97 increase suggest a small negative impact for younger workers and workers in small firms.
At the state level, I find more suggestive results of a negative impact of the minimum wage increases. New Jersey (1992) and Massachusetts (2000 Massachusetts ( -2001 exhibit negative effects of being in the treatment group on the probability of having employment-based health insurance for most of the specifications, while the results in Oregon (1991) and Connecticut (2000 Connecticut ( -2001 are more sensitive to the specification. The results suggest that being in the treatment group makes individuals 3 to 4 percentage points less likely to be policyholders of employment-based health insurance compared to the control group.
The paper is organized as follows: Section Two briefly reviews the previous literature; Section Three presents the theoretical background; Section Four includes the data and variables description; Section Five presents the empirical strategy, Section Six shows the main results and Section Seven draws the conclusions.
wage and the fringe benefits. Among studies related to employment, some of them find negative effect of minimum wages on employment, while other studies find ambiguous or positive effects.
Related Studies

Studies Examining the Minimum Wage Effects on Employment
The difference-in-difference approach I use in my empirical strategy has been used by a number of studies on the employment effects of the increases in the minimum wages. It is the results of such studies, particularly those of Card and Krueger (1994; that have caused many economists to doubt whether minimum wage laws in the U.S. have had a significant negative impact on employment.
In his recent review of the literature, Brown (1999) noted that as of the early 1980s, there was reasonably broad agreement among economists regarding the employment effects of minimum wages. Much of this agreement was based on time-series studies whose sample periods included the late 1970s. Most studies found significantly negative impacts of the minimum wages on teenagers, group known to have lower levels of formal education and labor market experience. In an earlier review of the literature, Brown et. al. (1982) concluded that the most likely impact of a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage probably reduced teenage employment by between 1 and 3 percent. Yet, Brown (1999) notes that the 1980s may not be a very promising time period during which to identify the employment effects of minimum wages because the federal minimum wage was fixed in nominal terms between 1981 and 1990, and the only variation in the real value of the federal minimum wage arose solely from increases in the overall price level. The more recent time series evidence led researchers to other approaches that make greater use of cross-sectional data (Brown 1999 (Brown , p. 2121 .
Probably the first study that could be characterized as using the difference-in-difference approach to estimate the impact of minimum wages is that of Egge et. al. (1970) . This study compared the low-wage and high-wage workers, using individuals paid more than the old level, but less than the new level of the 1967 minimum wage as the treatment group. Egge et. al. concluded that there is little evidence of negative effect on employment. While defining the treatment group in a similar way to Egge, Currie and Fallick (1996) found an adverse effect of the 1980 and 1981 increases in minimum wage on employment. However, Brown (1999) acknowledges that the 1981 recession may have been "harder on low-wage workers than others", hence the negative effects found by Currie and Fallick (p. 2141) , and that "low-wage workers faring well in expansion and poorly in recessions is a tempting conjecture in the absence of obvious alternatives" (p. 2142).
There are more studies that use a difference in difference approach to examine the effects of increases in minimum wages on the low-wage industry employment. Katz and Kruger (1992) examine the effects of 1991 federal minimum wage increase on fast-food restaurants in Texas, and Card and Kruger (1994) examine the 1992 increase in minimum wage in New Jersey. Both papers find no evidence that the fast food restaurants surveyed reduced employment. Card and Krueger (1994) compare low-wage restaurants in New Jersey to those in Pennsylvania, and lowwage and high-wage restaurants in New Jersey. In response to Card and Krueger (1994) , Neumark and Wascher (1998) collected their own data from fast food restaurants in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and found opposite effects of the minimum wages. When using BLS data, Neumark and Wascher find that employment in eating and drinking establishments (not just fastfood restaurants) increased more slowly in New Jersey than in Pennsylvania. Card and Krueger, on the other hand, find that employment in fast-food chains grew insignificantly faster in New Jersey. In his analysis of the literature, Brown (1999) concludes that "it is very hard to reject the hypothesis of no effect" (p. 2138) in both the Texas and the New Jersey examination of the minimum wages.
Studies Examining Fringe Benefits and the Minimum Wage
Besides studying the effects on employment, Katz and Kruger (1992) and Card and Kruger (1994) also verify if there are non-wage offsets of the increases in the minimum wage.
Both studies find no significant changes in the likelihood of receiving fringe benefits after the change in minimum wage took place. ), Beeson Royalty (2000 , and Simon and Kaestner (2003) explore the minimum wages effects on fringe benefits more extensively. presents theoretical models and empirical evidence for the effects of minimum wages on wages, employment, fringe benefits and working conditions. He shows that employers are likely to reduce fringe benefits and not to improve working conditions in order to offset part of the increase in wages due to mandated minimum wage laws. Beeson Royalty (2000) examines the effects of the minimum wage increases on the probability that low-skilled workers are eligible for pension benefits, health insurance benefits, and paid sick leave. The study finds a significant reduction in eligibility for pension benefits associated with increases in minimum wage, and less significant results for the effect of the minimum wage increase on health insurance and paid sick leave eligibility. Simon and Kaestner (2003) use data from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and the Current Population Survey and examine the effects of state and federal changes in the minimum wages on groups likely to be affected by minimum wages. Their results show no significant effects of the minimum wage on fringe benefits for low-skilled workers, at both the state and the federal level.
Most recently, Acemoglu and Pischke (2001) examine the effects of the state and federal increases in minimum wages between 1987 and 1992 on the on-the-job training of low wage workers. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), the authors find no evidence that minimum wages reduce training, and little evidence that they tend to increase training. Same conclusion is also reached by Brown (1999) .
Theoretical Background
Fringe benefits represent a significant proportion of the total compensation offered by the employers to their employees in return for labor. The theory of optimal fringe benefits puts together the firm's isoprofit curve and the workers' preferences, represented by indifference
curves. An indifference curve shows the various combinations of wages and fringe benefits that meet a constant level of utility for the worker. An isoprofit curve shows the possible combinations of wages and fringe benefits that provide a given level of profit for the firm. The indifference curve that is tangent to the isoprofit curve gives the optimal combination of wages and fringe benefits for both the worker and the firm. In the figure below, the optimal combination is * * ( , ) W F . Things are more complicated when we add workers with higher wages, not constrained by the minimum wage. Due to nondiscrimination rules, when firms employ both types of workers, they must offer the same level of fringe benefits to all workers. Carrington, McCue and Pierce (2002) show that nondiscrimination rules for firms with different types of workers limit within-firm inequality in preferential tax treatment benefits, but they place no corresponding constraint on within-firm inequality in wages. The authors assume that there are two types of workers in the labor market: blue-collar and white-collar. Workers have Cobb-Douglas preferences over wages (W) and fringe benefits (F):
There are three sectors in the economy: (a) a blue-collar sector with completely elastic demand for blue-collar labor, (b) a white-collar sector with completely elastic demand for white- proportions of one-to-one. I modify this assumption only slightly by assuming that a unit mass of workers is employed, where a proportion p is white-collar and a proportion 1-p is blue-collar.
The firm therefore minimizes
To see how the firm solves its problem, note that the firm could offer all workers the same level of fringe benefits as exists in equilibrium in the blue-collar sector,
, but in order to attract white-collar workers, would have to raise the white-collar wage to
In the limit, if the firm employs a large number of blue-collar workers this would be, approximately, the cost-minimizing wage rate for the white-collar workers. If, however, the firm employs a large number of white-collar workers, then it may want to offer a higher level of fringe benefits to its workers, thereby offering blue-collar workers a wage-fringes package with a higher level of utility than that available in the blue-collar sector. 3 When allowing for fringes to be higher in the mixed sector than in the blue-collar sector, the solutions to the minimization problem are:
The higher the share of the white-collar workers, the lower the increase in their wages, and the higher the level of fringe benefits is. This implies that a firm using a high share of whitecollar workers will keep the level of fringes offered to all workers at a relatively high level, and it will not be forced to increase the white-collar workers' wages too much. For a given minimum wage, the lower the share of white-collar workers, the lower the level of fringe benefits, and therefore, the higher the decrease in fringe benefits in the mixed sector is.
The fringe benefits fall for all workers in the blue-collar sector and in the mixed sector, but the magnitude of the effects depends on the level of the minimum wage. The change in the fringe benefits for blue-collar sector equals the increase in wages, in absolute value, and it is given by the formula:
The change in the fringe benefits for blue-collar workers in the mixed sector is expressed in terms of utilities for both blue-collar and white-collar workers, and is given by the formula:
When comparing the changes in fringe benefits between the blue-collar and the mixed sector, the expression becomes more complex:
Whether this expression is positive or negative depends on the original utility levels for bluecollar and white-collar workers, on their share in the mixed sector, and on the level of the minimum wage.
, then the decrease in fringe benefits is higher in the blue-collar sector than in the mixed sector.
However, if ( ) ( )
, then the decrease in fringe benefits is higher in the mixed sector than in the blue-collar sector. Brown (1999) noted that "as long as the minimum wage is set low enough that it affects only a small share of employment, the effect of the minimum wage on total employment is likely to be small and in any case swamped by other factors. Thus, it makes sense to focus on the analysis of low-wage groups, where the proportion directly affected is larger and so the anticipated effect on group employment is likely to be larger".
Although it is hard to clearly separate blue-collar workers from white-collar workers in the real world, I do associate low-skilled individuals with the blue-collar workers, and the rest of the population with the white-collar workers. As a measure of low skills I use the bottom 10%
and bottom 20% wage earners, and I examine whether there are any differences in their probability of being a policyholder of employment-based health insurance compared to the other workers after a binding minimum wage is imposed.
Data and Variable Description
For my 
Empirical Strategy
I use a difference-in-difference (DD) approach to assess the impact of the minimum wage on the employer-provided health insurance, a method used by other studies as well, especially those examining the employment effects of minimum wages. For increases in the state minimum wage I also use a difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) method. DD estimation is a commonly used empirical technique in economics, it implies that there is a treatment group and a control group for which outcomes are compared before and after a change that affects only the treatment group: Another difficulty is that DD estimates are sensitive to the choice of the pre-and post-periods as well as to the definition of the treatment and control groups (Brown 1999 ). Both at the federal level and at the state level, I use two treatment groups, bottom 10% and bottom 20% wage earners.
My study differs in a number of ways from that of both Beeson Royalty (2000) and Simon and Kaestner (2003) . In contrast to Beeson Royalty (2000) , who examined changes in eligibility for health insurance, I examine changes in actual coverage rates. Beeson Royalty In contrast to Simon and Kaestner (2003) , who use a quasi DD technique, I use a true DD estimation and allow for all the control variables to vary among low-wage and high-wage earners. Second, I explore the changes in the employment-based health insurance by wage groups and by demographic groups, while Simon and Kaestner explore general variation in health insurance and pension provision for all individuals. Third, I define different treatment groups than the authors. The CPS questions referring to labor and income are retrospective. Hence, there is a lag between the actual change in minimum wage and the year reflected in my data. β . To account for macroeconomic differences among states, I
control for the unemployment rate at the state level using March unemployment rates for each state and each year. The regressions weighted using individual weights.
Along with estimating probit regression, I estimate the probability of being a policyholder of employment-based health insurance and the difference in these probabilities between the treatment group and the control group. The standard errors are calculated using two hundred bootstrap replications.
The bootstrap is a type of Monte Carlo simulation which requires little additional programming besides the program code for the actual model. As noted in Cameron and Trivedi (2005) , the bootstrap is useful in computing standard errors when analytical formulas are complex (pp. 255). The procedure involves choosing random samples with replacement from a data set and analyzing each sample the same way. A bootstrap distribution approximates the sampling distribution of the statistic and it is used as a way to estimate the variation in a statistic based on the original data. Bootstrap distributions imitate the shape, spread, and bias of sampling distributions. Almost all of the variation among bootstrap distributions for a statistic is due to the selection of the original random sample from the population, resampling introduces little additional variation. The bootstrap can estimate the sampling distribution, bias, and standard error of a wide variety of statistics. The bootstrap standard error of a statistic is the standard deviation of its bootstrap distribution; it measures how much the statistic varies under random sampling.
The advantage of bootstrapping over analytical methods is its great simplicity; it is straightforward to apply the bootstrap to derive estimates of standard errors and confidence intervals for complex estimators of complex parameters of the distribution. However, there are some disadvantages as well: while under some conditions it is asymptotically consistent, it does not provide general finite sample guarantees, and has a tendency to be overly optimistic.
Results
The estimates of the probability of being policyholder of employment-based health insurance after changes in minimum wage take place at the federal level and at the state level are presented in Tables 1 to 6 . Along with estimating the probability of being insured for everyone I examine different groups of workers: individuals younger than 40, individuals working in small size firms, and young individuals working in small firms. I also examine the variation in the probabilities by race and ethnicity. Table 1 includes the probability of being policyholder of employment-based health insurance after 1990-91 changes in the federal minimum wage and the difference in these probabilities between the treatment and the control group. Regardless of the treatment group, bottom 10 or bottom 20% wage earners, almost all the specifications suggest that being in the treatment group after the 1990-91 changes in the federal minimum wage does not have a negative impact on one's probability of having employment-based health insurance in owns name. The only exception in the early 90s comes from the race group Others. The difference-indifference coefficients suggest that being in the bottom 10% or bottom 20% wage earners makes an individual 2.7 and 1 percent less likely to be a policyholder compared to the control group, non-bottom 10% and non-bottom 20% wage earners respectively. Among the workers included in the treatment group predicted probabilities of being insured vary from 11 percentage points for young adults working in small firms to 32 percentage points for Blacks before the increase in minimum wage, and from 10.5 percentage points for young adults working in small firms to 30.8
percentage points for Blacks after the increase in minimum wage. The estimated probabilities of being insured among the control group are, not surprisingly, much higher, around 33-35
percentage points for young workers and those working in small firms, and around 55-65
percentage points for everybody else.
Estimates of the impact of the 1996-97 changes in the federal minimum wage on the probability of being a policyholder of employment-based health insurance among treatment and control groups are presented in Table 2 . While in the early 90s only the difference-in-difference coefficient for Others suggested a negative impact of the minimum wage changes, in the late 90s the probability of being policyholder of employment-based health insurance is negatively affected for small size firms, for young adults as well as for Others. The workers in the treatment group have predicted probabilities of being insured of about 20 to 30 percentage points, while the probabilities for the workers in the control group span from 30 to 65 percentage points. The predicted probabilities are not too far off from the actual coverage rates along the period. Details about the sample size for each case study and the actual coverage rates through employmentbased health insurance are presented in Appendix B, tables B.1 to B.6, corresponding to tables 1 to 6.
In a recent article, Abraham, DeLeire and Beeson Royalty (2007) estimate the provision of several components of the compensation package in the small firms, and conclude, among other, that "workers employed at small firms are substantially less likely to be offered health insurance than those at larger firms." In this context, I obtain similar estimates for the workers in small firms after the 1996-97 minimum wage change. The difference-in-difference coefficient implies that being in the treatment group makes an individual about one to three percentage points less likely to have health insurance through employer compared to the control group.
Standard errors are larger than the coefficients making the results not very strong.
The results at the state level are presented in separate tables for each case study. The difference-in-difference coefficients for the Oregon increase in the minimum wage, included in Table 3 , suggest a negative impact of being in the bottom 10% wage earners for everyone, for young workers, for individuals working in small firms, and for Whites. However, the results are opposite when the treatment group is defined as bottom 20% wage earners. The gap in predicted probabilities of being insured as well as the gap between the actual coverage rates for the control and treatment group are bigger for bottom and non-bottom 10% wage earners compared to bottom and non-bottom 20% wage earners. the treatment group is, the New Jersey minimum wage increase has a negative impact on the probability of being insured for the treatment group compared to the control group. The difference-in-difference coefficients are suggestive, but not statistically significant. For example, being in the bottom 10% wage earners makes a White individual 3.7% less likely to be a policyholder of employment-based health insurance than a White non-bottom 10% wage earner.
Similarly, being in the bottom 20% wage earners makes a White individual 1.6% less likely to have health insurance coverage through employer than a White worker in the control group.
The difference-in-difference coefficients for the Connecticut increase in the minimum wage and the estimates of the predicted probabilities of having health insurance through the employer are displayed in Table 5 . Approximately half the specifications suggest a negative impact of being in the treatment group. While the predicted probabilities are lower after the increase in minimum wage, both for the treatment group and the control group, in some specifications the negative impact of the increase is higher for the workers paid lower wages. Also, to the extent that the share of low wage workers changes within the firms after a change in minimum wage takes place, it may be harder to identify the negative effect of this increase on the fringe benefits offered to low wage workers. This may bias the results by understating the true effect.
Conclusions
General studies regarding the variation in health insurance coverage rates over time suggest that the decline in health insurance coverage may be caused by an increase in the Medicaid eligibility, an economic recession, or an increase in the premiums that individuals have to pay. Studies which examined the relationship between the minimum wage and the fringe benefits failed to provide evidence that increased minimum wages reduce the fringe benefit receipt. Most of the previous literature has focused on the employment effects of the minimum wage, while the effects on the provision of fringe benefits were understudied by the researchers.
Using CPS data from 1988 to 2005, I examine the effects of minimum wage increases on the probability of having employment-based health insurance for bottom 10% and bottom 20% wage earners, compared to non-bottom 10% and non-bottom 20% wage earners.
At the federal level I find some evidence that employees in small firms, especially the younger ones, were negatively affected by changes in minimum wage that occurred in the late 1990s but not in the earlier 1990s. At the state level I analyze four case studies, Oregon (1991), New Jersey (1992), Connecticut (2000 Connecticut ( -2001 and Massachusetts (2000 Massachusetts ( -2001 , and I find more suggestive results of a negative impact of the minimum wage increases. New Jersey and
Massachusetts exhibit negative effects of being in the treatment group on the probability of having employment-based health insurance for most of the specifications, while the results in Oregon and Connecticut are more sensitive to the specification. The results suggest that being in the treatment group makes individuals 3 to 4 percentage points less likely to be policyholders of employment-based health insurance compared to the control group.
Future research may extend the case studies to the new increases in the federal minimum wage, which take place starting with the summer of 2007. It may also expand the analysis to include more fringe benefits, besides the employment-based health insurance. 1990-1991 and 1996-1997 . The window for each change is 1987-1989 and 1992-1994 for the first changes, and 1994-1996 and 1999-2001 for the second changes. Notes: I report the state minimum wages for New Jersey, for its neighbors, and for the federal level.
Results
The shaded represent the years with a change in state minimum wage; two years prior to the change and two years after the change are also included in the tables. Notes: I report the state minimum wages for Connecticut, for its neighbors, and for the federal level. The shaded represent the years with a change in state minimum wage; two years prior to the change and two years after the change are also included in the tables. Notes: I report the state minimum wages for Massachusetts, for its neighbors, and for the federal level. The shaded represent the years with a change in state minimum wage; two years prior to the change and two years after the change are also included in the tables. 
